Introduction
E-Commerce marketplaces increasingly exercise a form of economic power that is easy to overlook, control over visibility. A product may be available on a platform, yet a seller may receive little meaningful access to consumers if its product is consistently placed below competing listings. This makes search ranking more than a technical feature. It can influence both the consumer's purchasing decision and the competitive position of sellers.
The Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) (Amendment) Rules, 2026 (“E-commerce Rule 2026”)[1] recognise this by expressly regulating search-result manipulation, sponsored listings and ranking transparency. At the same time, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) has examined search bias, preferential treatment and the possibility of self-preferencing from a competition-law perspective. The resulting regulatory question is not whether one framework should replace the other, but how the two should operate without either over-regulating legitimate platform design or leaving genuine competitive harm outside scrutiny.
A consumer-protection baseline, not a competition code
The 2026 amendments introduce a useful degree of certainty for consumers. Rule 4(11)(c) of the E-Commerce Rules, 2026, as amended, prohibits an e-commerce entity from manipulating search results or search indexes in a manner that misleads users or adversely affects the relevance of results to their search query. Rule 4(12) requires sponsored listings to be distinctly identified through clear and prominent disclosures. For marketplace e-commerce entities, Rule 5(3)(f) requires disclosure of the principal parameters determining the ranking of goods or sellers, together with their relative importance.[2]
These provisions are a sensible development as it recognise that consumers cannot meaningfully exercise choice where the presentation of options is itself opaque or commercially disguised. The rules also avoid going so far as to prohibit sponsored placement altogether. Paying for visibility is not, by itself, an unfair practice but the regulatory concern is whether the commercial nature of that visibility is clearly communicated and whether the resulting presentation is misleading.
This is consistent with Section 18 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (“Consumer Protection Act”)[3], which empowers the Central Consumer Protection Authority (“CCPA”) to protect consumer rights as a class, prevent unfair trade practices and address false or misleading advertisements.
The important limitation, however, is that consumer transparency is not the same thing as competitive neutrality. A platform may fully disclose that a product is sponsored and still potentially use its market position in a way that disadvantages competing sellers. Conversely, a ranking decision may be commercially consequential for sellers without necessarily being deceptive to consumers. The two questions must therefore remain analytically distinct.
Competition law adds the market-power inquiry
Under the Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act, 2002”), the relevant inquiry is not simply whether a ranking decision appears unfair. Section 3 addresses anti-competitive agreements, while Section 4(1) of the Competition act, 2002 read with the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023[4] prohibits an enterprise or group from abusing a dominant position. The forms of abuse potentially relevant to platform ranking include conduct resulting in denial of market access under Section 4(2)(c) and leveraging of dominance in one market to enter or protect another under Section 4(2)(e).
This distinction matters because a platform does not become an antitrust offender merely because its ranking algorithm disadvantages some sellers. Competition law must establish the relevant market, assess the enterprise's market power and then determine whether the conduct constitutes the requisite form of abuse or anti-competitive arrangement.
The CCI's own Market Study on E-Commerce in India[5] illustrates why ranking has attracted attention. The CCI observed that seller access to customers depends substantially on search ranking, that organic ranking is controlled by the platform's search algorithm, and that the combination of marketplace and competitor roles may create incentives to favour private labels or preferred sellers. It also recorded concerns that the “black box” nature of ranking could make such bias difficult for consumers and sellers to detect.
Importantly, the CCI did not treat every ranking preference as inherently problematic. The same study records the platforms' position that private labels and integrated businesses can improve supply, address market gaps and create efficiencies, that balance remains important.[6] Ranking criteria such as price, availability, delivery speed, customer ratings and conversion may have legitimate commercial and consumer-facing purposes. The competition concern becomes stronger where the platform applies criteria selectively, conceals material commercial influences, favours its own competing products, or makes access to consumers effectively dependent upon conditions that rival sellers cannot reasonably replicate.
Indian experience shows both the potential and the evidentiary difficulty
India's case law already provides a useful illustration of this tension. In Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC[7], the CCI examined allegations of search bias and preferential treatment of Google's own specialised services. The Commission found Google dominant in the relevant markets and examined whether the design and placement of its specialised search results could distort competition.
The case is particularly relevant because the record shows both sides of the regulatory debate. The majority treated preferential placement as capable of restricting rivals' visibility and market access. At the same time, a dissenting opinion cautioned against inferring consumer harm merely from prominent placement without sufficient empirical evidence of user behaviour. The dissent specifically stressed the need for evidence concerning click-through behaviour and whether users were actually confused or misled by the sponsored format.
That evidentiary caution is valuable for the application of the E-Commerce Rules 2026 as well. A prohibition on misleading manipulation should not become a presumption that higher ranking equals consumer deception. Nor should an allegation that independent sellers have lost visibility automatically establish competitive foreclosure.
The difficulties are even clearer in the e-commerce marketplace cases. In AIOVA Sellers Association v. Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd.[8], the allegations included platform neutrality, preferential treatment, private labels and better placement for certain sellers. The Commission ultimately closed the information under Section 26(2) because the informant had not supplied sufficient admissible material to permit further examination. This does not amount to a finding that the alleged conduct was lawful. It demonstrates a practical problem, ranking allegations are difficult to prove without access to platform data, ranking logic, historical changes and reliable evidence of competitive effects. That is a limitation in a regulatory environment where the relevant decision-making mechanism is often proprietary and technically complex.
The two frameworks should reinforce, not duplicate, each other
The consumer framework can establish a baseline requiring platforms to tell consumers when visibility is paid, prevent materially misleading search manipulation and provide meaningful information about the main ranking parameters. Competition law can then examine whether those mechanisms are being used by a dominant enterprise in a manner that materially restricts competition.
Indian law already anticipates interaction between regulatory regimes. Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 permits the CCPA to refer matters for investigation in appropriate circumstances, while Sections 21 and 21A[9] of the Competition Act provide mechanisms for references between the CCI and other statutory authorities. In addition, Section 100 of the Consumer Protection Act states that the Act is not in derogation of other laws.[10]
This suggests that regulatory overlap is not necessarily a defect. It becomes problematic only when the same conduct is subjected to inconsistent assumptions, for example, when disclosure is treated as conclusive proof of competitive fairness, or when a competition concern is presumed from a consumer-law breach without establishing market power or exclusionary effects.
For platforms, three practical indicators are likely to be particularly important:
- Whether the stated ranking criteria correspond with the criteria used;
- Whether commercial payments or affiliated relationships have a material but inadequately disclosed influence on visibility; and
- Whether the practice has effects beyond individual consumers, such as systematic disadvantage to rival sellers or denial of effective access to customers.
The international position is moving beyond transparency alone
The Indian framework is not developing in isolation. The European Union (“EU”) provides a useful comparison because it distinguishes ranking transparency from substantive controls on self-preferencing.
Under the EU's Platform-to-Business Regulation, providers of online intermediation services must disclose the main parameters determining ranking and explain their relative importance. Providers of online search engines must publicly describe the main ranking parameters, and where ranking can be influenced by direct or indirect remuneration, must explain that possibility and its effect on ranking.[11]
The EU subsequently went further for designated gatekeepers. Article 6(5) of the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) prohibits gatekeepers from treating their own products or services more favourably in ranking, indexing or crawling than similar products or services offered by third parties. The European Commission has applied this provision in investigating Alphabet's treatment of its own vertical search services in Google Search.[12]
The development is significant because the EU framework distinguishes between transparency and substantive neutrality, transparency can make ranking practices more intelligible, but it does not by itself prohibit a gatekeeper from favouring its own services. Article 6(5) addresses that separate concern directly.
The underlying competition principle was also evident in Google Shopping. The Court of Justice in Google and Alphabet v. Commission (Google Shopping) upheld the finding that Google had abused its dominant position by favouring its own comparison-shopping service through more favourable positioning and display in general search results.[13]
The United Kingdom provides another interesting development. In 2026, the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) imposed a Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement on Google under the UK's digital-markets regime. The requirement requires Google to rank organic search results on objective and non-discriminatory criteria, apply the same objective criteria to third-party and its own content, and provide greater transparency concerning ranking and material changes affecting publishers.[14]
These approaches suggest a broader regulatory trend: as platforms become important gateways to customers, ranking is increasingly being treated as a matter of governance and competitive neutrality, rather than merely as product design.
Conclusion
The 2026 amendments are a constructive step because they address a genuine weakness in digital commerce, consumers and sellers often experience ranking outcomes without knowing sufficiently how those outcomes are produced. Requiring disclosure, distinguishing sponsored placement and prohibiting misleading manipulation creates a meaningful transparency floor.
The rules nevertheless leave an important question open. Transparency can expose a ranking system, but it does not necessarily constrain the economic power exercised through that system. The Indian framework presently addresses self-preferencing less directly than the EU's DMA, and effective enforcement will depend substantially on the regulator's ability to obtain reliable evidence about ranking criteria, commercial incentives and market effects.
The appropriate regulatory position is therefore neither to prohibit platform discretion nor to assume that algorithmic neutrality is always achievable. Platforms need legitimate freedom to rank products according to consumer relevance, quality, price, availability and other lawful criteria. At the same time, where ranking becomes a mechanism through which a powerful platform controls access to consumers for its own commercial advantage, consumer transparency may be necessary but not sufficient.
Ultimately, the strongest framework is one in which consumer law asks whether the platform's presentation is fair and intelligible, while competition law asks whether the platform's control over visibility is being used to distort competitive conditions. Where both forms of harm arise from the same ranking decision, concurrent scrutiny is justified, but only through the distinct statutory tests applicable to each regime.
Authorities and Notes
- Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) (Amendment) Rules, 2026, G.S.R. 789(E) (India 2026), effective Jan. 1, 2027. https://consumeraffairs.gov.in/public/upload/admin/cmsfiles/whatsnews/E_Commerce_Amendment_Rules_2026_2026-09-11_18-12-39.pdf
- Id, rr. 4(11)(c), 4(12), 5(3)(f), (E-Commerce Rules 2026).
- Consumer Protection Act, No. 35 of 2019, § 18, 2019. India. https://ncdrc.nic.in/bare_acts/CPA2019.pdf
- The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, No. 9 of 2023, §§ 3-4 2023. (India). https://www.cci.gov.in/images/legalframeworkact/en/the-competition-amendment-act-20231681363446.pdf
- Competition Comm'n of India, Market Study on E-Commerce in India: Key Findings and Observations pg. 21–22 (2020). https://www.cci.gov.in/economics-research/market-studies/details/18/6
- Id. at pg. 22.
- Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC, Case Nos. 07 & 30 of 2012, paras. 20, 22, 173–175, 195–196 (Competition Comm'n of India Jan. 31, 2018). https://www.cci.gov.in/antitrust/orders/details/746/0
- AIOVA Sellers Ass’n v. Amazon Seller Servs. Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 29 of 2020, Para. 9, 11–13, 26–29 (Competition Commission of India Mar. 3, 2022).
- Competition Act, 2002, §§ 21, 21A.
- Consumer Protection Act, 2019, §§ 19 & 100
- Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, art. 5(1)–(3), 2019 O.J. (L 186) 57, 71. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R1150
- Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, art. 6(5), 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1, 35. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925
- Google and Alphabet v. Commission (Google Shopping), Case C-48/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:726, Para. 22, 267, 271 (Sept. 10, 2024). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0048
- CMA, Fair Ranking Conduct Requirement, Para. 1.7, 2.1, 3.7 (June 17, 2026). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6a312d91cd3a3f24b55a5c00/_Fair_ranking_CR_final_decision_.pdf
This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific matter, please contact us at Info@tarakshlaw.com
Prepared by Kunal Sharma, Founder & Managing Partner, with assistance from Nimit Jain, Paralegal.
